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By Professor Lakshman Dissanayake – Emeritus Professor of Demography, University of Colombo– Sri Lanka’s latest population census has delivered what appears to be a demographic shock. According to the 2024 Census of Population and Housing, the country’s fertility rate has fallen to just 1.3 children per woman—a level usually associated with some of the world’s lowest-fertility societies. If taken at face value, this would signal a dramatic and rapid shift in how Sri Lankan families are formed.

But is this really a fertility crisis—or are we misreading the numbers?A closer look at the data suggests that the story may be more complex. While births have clearly declined in recent years, much of the change appears to reflect delays in marriage and childbearing, combined with possible gaps in how recent births are recorded. In other words, the headline figure may be capturing timing and measurement issues rather than a true collapse in family size.

Fertility does not usually fall this quickly. Even in the world’s lowest-fertility settings, declines have taken place gradually over long periods.In South Korea, fertility has fallen steadily over several decades, with only modest declines in recent years despite major social and economic change. Across Europe, fertility dropped from around 2.6 in the 1960s to about 1.3 today—a transition that unfolded over more than fifty years.Against this global experience, Sri Lanka’s reported decline—from 2.42 in 2012 to 1.32 in 2024—suggests a drop of more than one child per woman in just over a decade. That is an exceptionally rapid pace, rarely seen anywhere in the world.

Such a sharp decline would normally be associated with major transformations in society—such as widespread changes in marriage, strong shifts in reproductive behaviour, or large-scale economic restructuring.However, the available evidence does not point to changes of that magnitude. Marriage Is Delayed, Not Declining Marriage patterns provide an important clue.

Women are marrying later, with the average age at marriage rising from about 23 years in 2012 to nearly 26 years in 2024. But most women still marry by their early 30s. This suggests a delay in marriage, not a rejection of it among older age groups, marriage remains nearly universal. By their 30s, the large majority of women are married, just as in earlier periods.

This matters because, in Sri Lanka, childbearing takes place almost entirely within marriage. If marriage is only being postponed rather than avoided, we would expect births to be delayed—not permanently reduced to very low levels.

Fertility Within Marriage Remains Strong An even more important piece of evidence comes from looking at fertility among married women. The data show that married women are still having, on average, around 2 to 3 children over their reproductive years. This indicates that family size preferences have not collapsed. This is a crucial point. If married women continue to have around two or more children, it becomes difficult to explain how overall fertility could have fallen to 1.3—unless far fewer women are marrying at all. But the data clearly show that this is not happening.

In other words, the foundation of family formation in Sri Lanka remains largely intact.

What the Data May Be Missing

The explanation may lie not in behaviour, but in how fertility is measured.

Unlike specialised surveys, censuses do not collect detailed birth histories. Instead, they rely on simpler questions, which can sometimes miss births or record them inaccurately—especially recent ones.

Demographers often check for this by comparing the total number of children women report having with the number of births recorded in recent years. When these do not match, it usually indicates that some births have been missed.

When this type of check is applied to Sri Lanka’s 2024 data, it suggests that fertility may have been significantly undercounted. After making adjustments, the more realistic estimate appears to be closer to about 2.1 children per woman—not 1.3.

This does not mean fertility is not declining. It is. But the pace and extent of that decline appear to be overstated.

The Role of Recent Crises

Timing also plays a major role.

The 2024 census reflects a period immediately after the COVID-19 pandemic and during one of the most severe economic crises in Sri Lanka’s recent history.

In many countries, such periods of uncertainty lead people to postpone having children. Fertility temporarily drops—not because families want fewer children overall, but because they delay births.

This pattern has been observed in countries such as Italy, Spain, and the United States during times of economic and social disruption.

Sri Lanka is likely experiencing a similar effect. Births are being postponed, not necessarily abandoned.

These patterns are consistent with delay, not a long-term collapse in fertility.

Why This Matters

Getting fertility right is not just an academic issue, it has real consequences.

If we assume that fertility has collapsed to extremely low levels, it could lead to unnecessary alarm about rapid population decline. On the other hand, ignoring real changes could leave the country unprepared for future challenges.

Sri Lanka is already ageing. The number of older persons is increasing, and the pressure on the working population is growing. These trends require careful policy responses, including strengthening pension systems, supporting older persons—especially women who often live alone—and creating opportunities for younger generations.

But these challenges should be addressed based on accurate data.

A More Balanced View

The evidence suggests that Sri Lanka is not experiencing a sudden collapse in fertility. Rather, what we are observing is a combination of delayed marriage, postponed childbearing, and possible gaps in how recent births are captured in census data. Fertility is clearly changing, but it is not disappearing.

This distinction is more than a technical detail—it has direct implications for public policy.

If the current figure of 1.3 is taken at face value, it could create a sense of urgency around population decline, potentially leading to premature or misdirected policy responses. Governments might be pushed toward aggressive pronatalist policies, incentives for childbirth, or alarm-driven narratives about shrinking population size. However, if fertility is in fact closer to replacement level, such responses may not only be unnecessary but could divert attention from more pressing structural challenges.

The real issue facing Sri Lanka is not a sudden collapse in births, but a gradual demographic transition combined with population ageing. The policy priority, therefore, should be to adapt to this transition rather than react to a potentially misleading headline number.

This means strengthening pension systems and ensuring income security in old age, particularly as traditional family support structures evolve. It also requires investing in the health and productivity of the working-age population, so that a smaller workforce can remain economically resilient. At the same time, policies must address youth employment, female labour force participation, and the growing outmigration of skilled workers, all of which have far more immediate implications for the economy than fertility levels alone.

In addition, there is a clear need to improve the quality of demographic data. Reliable fertility measurement is essential for accurate population projections, which in turn guide planning in education, healthcare, housing, and social protection. Strengthening data systems—through better census design and complementary surveys—should be treated as a policy priority in its own right.

Ultimately, sound policy depends not just on numbers, but on interpreting those numbers correctly. Misreading demographic signals can lead to misplaced priorities and ineffective interventions.

Before concluding that Sri Lanka is facing a demographic crisis, we must first ensure that we are reading the data with the care and caution it requires.