The intractable India-Sri Lanka dispute over fishing
A Sri Lankan gunboat accosting an Indian trawler.A Sri Lankan gunboat accosting an Indian trawler.
There has been no dearth of ideas to solve the problem, but practicalities and political compulsions have prevented the parties concerned from trying out the proposals.
The dispute between India and Sri Lanka over fishing rights in thePalk Bay/Palk Strait appears to be intractable. Various solutions have been thought of, but none has attained fruition. There is no light at the end of tunnel even now, decades after the problem flared up.
There has been no dearth of ideas to solve the problem, but practicalities and political compulsions have prevented the parties concerned from trying out the proposals.
According to Dr. Rajni Gamage and Isha Gupta of the National University of Singapore (NUS), in the 1980s, India sought to technologically improve fishing practices in its southern coast by promoting mechanised trawlers. As a result, there was a sharp increase in trawlers from 1,568 to 3,339 between 1986 and 2000 in the Palk Bay.
But this resulted in fish getting depleted on the Indian side of the Palk Bay, forcing Indian fishermen to venture into Sri Lankan waters. Indian poaching resulted in an annual loss to Sri Lanka amounting to US$40 million to US$ 54 million by various estimates. It also adversely affected the livelihood of fishermen in the North Sri Lankan coast. The traditional methods and less-developed trawlers employed by the North Lankan fishermen provided lesser yields, adding to the tension in the region.
During the thirty-year war in North Sri Lanka against Tamil militants, poachers from Tamil Nadu were in cahoots or under the thumb of the Tamil militants. The Sri Lankan navy faced the uphill task of tacklingthe intruders.
After the end of the war in 2009, when the North Lankan fishermen resumed fishing, they came face to face with the poachers. Confrontations occurred in which the poachers had the upper hand because of their superior numbers.
At times the Sri Lankan Navy opened fire causing casualties which led to agitations on the Indian side of the Palk Bay. The Indian government would then ask Colombo to exercise restraint. Diplomatic intervention would result in the arrested fishermenbeing released.
New Delhi and Colombo would also discuss the issue every time there was a bilateral meeting. The Indian side would routinely seek humane treatment and the release of captured poachers. And the Sri Lankan side would oblige. A joint working group was set up to contain the conflict. But the problem would continue.
While the Indian side would be under domestic political pressure to justify the intrusions, from the Sri Lankan side there would be little or no pressure on India to restrain the wayward Tamil Nadu fishermen.
Colombo would not want to rock the Indo-Lankan diplomatic boat and North Sri Lankan Tamil politicians would avoid alienating Indian or Tamil Nadu leaders whose help they need to secure their political objectives in Sri Lanka. The result would be a stalemate during which poaching would continue and mount.
In contrast to the passivity in Sri Lanka, in Tamil Nadu, any confrontation with the Sri Lankan navy or arrest would be given great political importance. The reason – the fishing community there has political clout which the North Lankan fishermen lack.
Over the years, Tamil Nadu politicians have adopted a variety of strategies to mollify the fishing community. Apart from demanding New Delhi’s diplomatic intervention to get captured poachers released, they would, from time to time, seek the retrieval of Kachchatheevu island, which, they maintain, was “bartered away” to Sri Lanka in a maritime boundary deal in the mid-1970s for the sake of befriending the then Colombo regime.
The demand to retrieve Kachchatheevu is premised on the claim that Tamil Nadu fishermen go up to only Kachchatheevu island and not beyond. They claim that they get arrested around Kachchatheevu where they claim to have a right to fish according the 1970s agreement. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan side says that Indian fishermen can only dry their nets on Kachchatheevu, not to fish.
Be that as it may, the fact is that the Indian fisherman routinely go beyond Kachchatheevu, almost up to the shores of the Sri Lankan mainland.Tamil Nadu governments have gone to the courts to get back Kachchatheevu, but only to be told that the maritime boundary agreement putting Kachchatheevu on the Sri Lankan side could not be abrogated or reopened. But this has not prevented Tamil Nadu governments, the political parties and the media from harping on the demand to retrieve the island.
when J.Jayalalithaa was Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, her government and the Indian government together tried to motivate fishermen to take to deep sea fishing using multi-day boats and refrain from fishing only in the Palk Bay.he plan was to supply 2000 deep sea going tuna long liners by 2020.
In the first phase, 500 tuna long liners cum gill netters were to be suppled at a total cost of INR 4050 million. The cost would be shared by the Governments of India and Tamil Nadu, the beneficiaries and banks. In the second phase (2018-2019), another 500 boats were to be supplied. In the third and final phase, 1000 boats were to be delivered,all at the same cost.
The total liability for the Indian Government would have been INR 8 billion, and for the Tamil Nadu Government INR 3.2 billion. The fisher beneficiaries would be providing INR 1.6 billion. Bank borrowing would amount to INR 3200 million. And the fishermen would get a subsistence allowance during the conversion.
But initially, the expected finances did not come from the Central government. Therefore, Chief Minister Jayalalithaa started implementing her own scheme. In the 2011 Tamil Nadu budget, she proposed a subsidy of 25% for the conversion of trawlers to sea going vessels. In the 2013 budget, she hiked the subsidy to 50%. She also sought INR 15,200 million as grant from the Indian government. Under the Tamil Nadu scheme, 171 tuna long liners were built by mid-2016.
However, the bid to popularise deep sea fishing failed because of the reluctance of the fishermen to go into the deep sea. They were habitual coastal fishermen. Moreover, in deep-sea fishing, fishermen had to be at sea for weeks or even months to be able to break even. The coastal fishermen did not smell profit in switching over to deep-sea, multi-day fishing.
Licensing of fishing in Sri Lankan waters was also spoken about. In 2003, the Tamil Nadu Government proposed “licensed fishing” in certain areas of the Palk Strait and Palk Bay where Sri Lankans did not fish. When New Delhi took this up with Colombo, the latter promised to consider it, but there was no follow up. Limiting the days for fishing were also discussed.
However, the key issue was banning bottom trawling. Sri Lanka had banned it but India has been reluctant to do so for political reasons. North Lankan fishermen have stated, times without number, that they have no objection to Indian fishermen fishing in their waters if they use traditional fishing boats and non-destructive fishing methods as they themselves do. But Tamil Nadu fishermen have remained unmoved.
Joint fishing and joint development of the marine resources have also been suggested. But there has been no follow up. Experts like Dr. Rajni Gamage and Isha Guptaof NUS have suggested the establishment of a common authority to manage the various maritime concerns in the Palk Bay. This authority could handle disputes, set regulations and designate regions and timings for fishing, they have said.
For appropriate and informed decision-making, the authority could consult ecologists, marine biologists, representatives of fishermen from India and Sri Lanka, and government officials from both countries. But there has been no follow up action on these proposals because the fishermen’s issue is stuck in the web of real politik interests.
